This issue cannot coherently be discussed independently of destiny (qadar) and faith (iman). Setting destiny aside for the moment, faith is not a phenomenon that requires rational demonstration. Indeed, I am inclined to think that when faith depends upon reason—either in the form of proof-seeking or through attempts to reinforce belief with scientific evidence—it reveals a comparatively weakened form of faith. In the limiting case, were the existence of God to be established through empirical demonstration, belief would cease to be faith and would instead become a form of compelled assent.
When we turn to action (‘amal) and worship, the respective roles of the heart, revelation, and reason become less straightforward. One may be tempted to end the discussion by asserting that revelation, as the word of God, admits of no debate. Yet this response seems inadequate. The matter concerns the transition from belief in God’s existence, grounded in faith, to the apprehension of God through reason. If revelation is indeed the word of God, then reason cannot be the product of an independent or rival source of authority; reason, too, is bestowed by God. While it is true in a literal sense that intellectual capacities are not distributed equally, the human ability to acquire knowledge and to engage in reasoning at all exists only by divine will. I will not pursue here the familiar problem of whether this commits one to attributing evil to God as well, and the broader metaphysical difficulties that follow.
I recently encountered the claim—on Ekşi Sözlük, no less—that “the source of knowledge is revelation.” Taken at face value, this assertion raises difficulties. If one compares the current state of the social sciences and philosophy—not merely the natural sciences—with revelation, it may appear that revelation stands at a disadvantage. How is this to be explained? Is one to appeal to popular apologetic tropes, such as the non-mixing waters of the seas, or to numerological schemes of the sort associated with Ömer Çelakıl?
The explanation commonly offered invokes müteşabih ayetler (mutashabih verses: passages whose meaning is allegorical, ambiguous, or not fully determinate). The Qur'an itself affirms the existence of such verses, yet does not specify which verses fall into this category. This raises an obvious concern: are these verses intended to function as a kind of interpretive wild card, to be invoked whenever one encounters a theological or philosophical dead end? Should believers simply refrain from engaging with such passages and proceed only on the basis of those deemed clear? If so, why do these verses exist at all, and why is their existence explicitly disclosed?
It would be implausible to suppose that these verses are meant to license arbitrary interpretation. A believer must seek refuge in God from both intentional and unintentional misinterpretation. Indeed, in order to avoid even the smallest risk of falling into shirk, one might argue that interpretive restraint should be maximized. Since any non-zero degree of shirk remains shirk, this line of reasoning appears to demand interpretive inaction.
Yet this position introduces a further difficulty. Does denying the possibility of concealed or layered meanings in verses presumed to be clear not itself risk theological error? How, then, is one to assess acceptable risk in interpretation? At this point, reason re-enters the picture. God has granted human beings reason for precisely such cases, and intention (niyyah) is central to the moral evaluation of action. If one employs God-given reason to interpret God-given revelation, fully aware of the possibility of error, and does so with sincere intention, one necessarily relies on divine mercy. To deny that mercy is to return to a more fundamental problem: a failure to adequately grasp the God whose existence is affirmed by faith.
If reason and revelation are genuinely complementary, neither should enjoy unconditional priority over the other. While exceptional circumstances may arise, this complementarity should be the default position. Since reason is universally present among human beings, there can be no situation entirely devoid of reason. Revelation, however, may be absent, inaccessible, or historically unknown. In such conditions, what remains available to human beings are precisely faith and reason—and these must suffice.